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In this paper we present the results of two experiments designed to understand how physics students’
learning of the concept of refraction is influenced by the cognitive phenomenon of ‘‘specificity.’’ In both
experiments participants learned why light bends as it travels from one optical medium to another with an
analogy made to a car driving from paved road into mud and vice versa. They then learned how to
qualitatively draw the direction of refracted light rays with an example of a glass prism. One group learned
with a rectangular prism example while a second group learned with a triangular prism example. In a
transfer test, the participants revealed how, even when they seemed able to implement the refraction
concept, their responses were biased by the example they had seen. Participants frequently violated the
refraction principle they had just learned (reversing the bend direction) in order to make sure their
response matched the surface features of their learning example. This tended to happen when their test
question looked superficially similar to their learning example. We discuss the implications of these
results for physics instruction.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevSTPER.7.010105 PACS numbers: 01.40.Fk, 01.40.Ha
I. INTRODUCTION
How and what do students learn from the examples we
show them in a physics class? In physics we often explain
abstract physics principles to students. We then apply the
principle to one or more concrete examples. We hope that
students will develop a deeper understanding of the physics
principle and how it is connected to real-life situations. We
hope that students will be able to generalize their knowl-
edge to many situations, displaying evidence of transfer.
In cognitive science, Ross showed that if the content of
the new situation is similar to the training example used to
illustrate the principle, then the features of this new content
become a strong cue for students to use the same method or
procedure as they learned in the training example. Even
when students understand a particular principle, students’
understanding of the principle becomes bound up in the
particulars of the example that is used to illustrate the
principle [1–5]. This phenomenon is known as the ‘‘spe-
cificity effect.’’
The question we want to ask is, How do students use
prior examples that they have seen in their physics course
to solve new problems? More specifically, can we see
evidence for the specificity effect in learning physics?
Answering this question is ultimately an issue of transfer.
It is critical for understanding the dynamics of the transfer
process. One possibility is that in order to successfully
solve a problem, a student needs to recognize what sort
of a problem it is (e.g., ‘‘this is an energy conservation
problem’’) and transfer their principled understanding [6].
Another possibility is the analogy or similarity view. In this
view, students cue ideas based on the similarity between
the target problem and features of prior examples in which
the principle has been applied. In reality, it is probably not
an either/or situation [7]. Research in problem solving and
transfer has also shown that students transfer surface fea-
tures of examples they have seen before into new situations
[8]. But, Podolefsky and Finkelstein, using their analogical
scaffolding model, have shown that students blend repre-
sentations together to make new ones, and may transfer
deeper structure into new situations as part of a blended
representation [9].
We believe that the specificity effect is common in
physics learning and could have unexpected consequences
for what students learn and how they apply physics prin-
ciples in new situations. We will present two experiments
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that we conducted to test for the presence of this effect.
Based on the specificity hypothesis, we predicted that even
when students are able to implement the principle, the
surface features of a particular testing situation (if similar
enough to their learning example) could override their
principle knowledge. In such cases, students’ solutions
would be heavily influenced by the particular learning
example, though they can apply the principle correctly to
other problems.
As we will show in this paper, the outcomes of the
experiments that we conducted not only supported the
hypothesis of specificity in student reasoning, but provided
us with interesting insights into possible factors that in-
crease or decrease the incidence of this effect.
II. METHOD
A. Participants
In experiment 1 we recruited 31 undergraduate physics
students from a large Midwestern university to learn about
refraction. All students were in their first semester of an
introductory algebra-based physics course for life-science
majors and premeds. Participants were randomly assigned
to one of two learning conditions that each used a different
illustrative example, a triangle prism (T-trained, n ¼ 15) or
a rectangle prism (R-trained, n ¼ 16). In experiment 2 we
recruited 48 undergraduate physics students to learn about
refraction. The students were in their first semester of a
calculus-based physics course for engineers and physics
majors. As before, students were randomly assigned to
either the triangle learning condition (n ¼ 25) or the rect-
angle learning condition (n ¼ 23).
B. Materials and procedures
In order to help participants learn about refraction we
engaged them in a 20-min instructional sequence.
(1) Participants saw a demonstration of the actual physi-
cal apparatus of the prism and refraction of a laser beam
through the prism. In the rectangle condition, participants
saw a laser beam being refracted through a rectangular
prism. In the triangle condition, participants saw a laser
beam being refracted through an equilateral triangular
prism.
(2) Participants learned that light was a wave and the
instructor provided an analogy to water waves traveling
towards a beach so that they could visualize in the case of
electromagnetic plane waves—the orientation between the
wave fronts and the direction of travel. They were able to
visualize the light from the laser beam in a similar way
using this analogy.
(3) The instructor then introduced the idea that light
travels at different speeds in different optical media.
Students learned that the refractive index of a particular
medium is expressed as the ratio of the speed of light in the
vacuum to the speed of light in that medium.
(4) The instructor offered participants an analogy in-
volving a car slowing down as it transitioned from paved
road to mud and speeding up as it transitioned from mud to
paved road. Whichever wheel entered or exited the mud
first would slow down or speed up first and cause the car to
twist in the appropriate direction.
(5) Finally, participants were asked to apply the car
analogy to the case of refraction, applying it to either the
rectangle prism (R-trained group) or the triangle prism
(T-trained group). After a short discussion, the instructor
challenged students to fix their work if they made mistakes
before finally modeling for them [10] how to apply refrac-
tion using the car analogy. Figure 1 shows the learning
examples used in experiment 1. Figure 2 shows the modi-
fied examples used in experiment 2. In all cases, when the
instructor modeled drawing the rays in the example, wave
fronts were inserted in the diagram to help participants
make connections to the analogy. Normal lines were also
drawn at each prism interface.
In experiment 1, this learning phase was followed by a
four-question test given to all participants. In each ques-
tion, students were asked to complete the light ray and
extend their exiting ray until it intersected with the screen.
The test questions are shown in Table I. Question 4 was
included to assess whether participants could apply the
principle of refraction at a single interface. No screen
was provided in question 4. In question 1 students were
FIG. 1. Rectangle and triangle training examples for
experiment 1.
FIG. 2. Rectangle and triangle training examples for experi-
ment 2. Note that the triangle example was modified from
experiment 1 for reasons that are explained later in the text.
BROOKES, ROSS, AND MESTRE PHYS. REV. ST PHYS. EDUC. RES. 7, 010105 (2011)
010105-2
told that the D prism was a half-circle and C marked the
center of the circle.
In experiment 2, the instructional phase was followed by
a five-question test. The instructions were the same, but the
test questions were modified from experiment 1. The test
questions are shown in Table II. Here, question 5 was used
as our criterion as to whether the student could apply the
principle of refraction. In contrast with question 4 of
experiment 1, no normal line was provided to help
students.
The presence of the screens requires explanation: The
screens were placed in the questions because we were
initially unsure how we were going to measure the biases
in how participants drew the light rays. In the end, the
screens turned out to be unnecessary as we simply used a
protractor to measure the angle between the incident or
refracted rays and the normal line at each interface.
III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. What did students think about the instruction?
In a written posttest survey, we found that participants
were enthusiastic about the pavement-mud analogy and
thought that it really helped them understand the principle
of refraction. One of the questions asked subjects, ‘‘Do you
have any comments about the way you were taught today
or the problems you were asked to solve?’’ Some typical
participant responses were as follows.
‘‘Yes, the analogy helped a lot. It made it much easier to
visualize the solution.’’
TABLE II. The five assessment questions for experiment 2. The order of presentation of questions 1 and 2, and questions 3 and 4,
was counterbalanced. Participants were not allowed to return to a previous question once they had completed it and gone on to the next
question.
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5
Rectangle prism Triangle prism Trapezium 1 Trapezium 2
TABLE I. The four assessment questions for experiment 1. The order of presentation of questions 2 and 3 was counterbalanced.
Participants were not allowed to return to a previous question once they had completed it and gone on to the next question.
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4
D prism Rectangle prism Triangle prism
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‘‘I liked the analogies. Made it very easy to understand
without a lot of math!’’
‘‘The analogy really helped. Using the tires of the car to
see which end left the medium first really helped me
understand the direction it would exit.’’
‘‘I love the examples of the wheels. I was not really sure
how the light is refracted; I just memorized. But now I
understand why the light is refracted that way.’’
‘‘I did not get it until the professor used the car analogy.’’
In experiment 1, 35% of the participations spontaneously
mentioned how helpful the car analogy was. In experi-
ment 2, exactly half of the students mentioned their appre-
ciation for the car analogy. The fact that the analogy helped
the students understand the principle of refraction is an
interesting result itself. However, for us the most important
aspect of these data is the fact that the students entered the
testing phase feeling that they had a clear and deep under-
standing of how to implement the refraction principle.
B. Experiment 1: Algebra students
1. General example bias
In examining the results, the first question we asked is, Is
there a general bias to students’ responses that can be
traced back to the training example they saw? Since
R-trained participants saw the exiting ray bending
upwards, while T-trained participants saw the exiting ray
of the example bending downwards, we might expect a
general upward bias to R-trained participants’ responses,
relative to those who were trained with the triangle ex-
ample. This turns out to be the case, as shown in Table III.
We measured each student’s angle of refraction at the
first interface (air to glass in questions 1–3, glass to air in
question 4). In questions 1–3 we also measured the angle of
incidence to the second glass-air interface and the second
refracted angle from glass to the air. We then developed a
quantitative measure of their upward or downward bias at
the second interface as follows: We defined our measure
m: m ¼ ng sini  na sinr, where we used the refractive
index of glass, ng ¼ 1:5, and the refractive index of air,
na ¼ 1. We want to compare how much each participant
bent their refracted ray down or up relative to the incident
ray at the second interface. Using a measure comprised out
of Snell’s law is the simplest and most obvious way to
measure how much the refracted ray is bent relative to the
incident ray.
There are three interesting patterns that can be inferred
from Table III. (a) In questions 1–3, there is a significant or
marginally significant difference between the two groups’
first refracted angle (air-glass). Although this could be
interpreted as a manifestation of the specificity effect
at the first interface, this difference is likely attributable
TABLE III. Summary of the angles and measures for participants in experiment 1.
Question 1, D prism Question 2, Rectangle prism Question 3, Triangle prism Question 4, Single interface
Interface Air-Glass Glass-Air Air-Glass Glass-Air Air-Glass Glass-Air Glass-Air
Measure r ng sini  na sinr r ng sini  na sinr r ng sini  na sinr r
R-trained 15 0.36 25 0.79 35 0.28 34
T-trained 3 0:05 7 0.14 20 0:26 19
p (t test) 0.02 <0:001 0.02 <0:001 0.06 0.005 0.27
FIG. 3. Two subjects’ responses to test questions 1,2, and 3.
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to T-trained participants’ tendency to make the ray inside
the prism horizontal (as in the training example), irrespec-
tive of context. Figure 3 shows a side-by-side comparison
of the responses of two participants who learned through
different examples. Student 003’s responses are typical of
the group who saw the triangle example. Student 203’s
responses are typical of the group that saw the rectangle
example. The overall bias at the first air-glass interface led
us to modify the training example for the triangle group in
experiment 2. (See Fig. 2.) (b) Another upward or down-
ward bias can be seen at the second glass-air interface in
questions 1–3. (c) R-trained and T-trained participants do
not show any significant example bias in their responses to
question 4.
2. Specificity
The general upward or downward bias of responses on
questions 1–3 is interesting, but only suggestive of the
specificity effect we expected. It simply may be the case
that students, having seen only one training example, do
not know any better than to make their responses match
their training example as best they can. However, the
results on question 4 do not support this hypothesis. If
training with a rectangle or triangle prism led to a simple
upward or downward bias in participants’ responses, then
we would expect to observe that bias in question 4. As
noted in the previous section, there is no evidence of a bias
in participants’ responses to question 4.
More importantly, are there participants who demon-
strate both evidence that they understand the principle of
refraction and evidence that their knowledge is bound to
the features of their training example? In this section we
restrict our analysis to those participants who answered
question 4 correctly (18 out of 31, or 58%). In our sample,
7 out of 15 (47%) of the T-trained participants answered
question 4 correctly and 11 out of 16 (69%) of the
R-trained participants answered question 4 correctly.
These 18 participants were able to apply the principle of
refraction at a single interface and therefore we assumed
they understood the principle of refraction. In addition, all
but one of these participants drew wave fronts and/or
normal lines in questions 1, 2, and/or 3, suggesting that
they were overtly attempting to apply the ideas they had
just learned in a principled way. (Note the normal lines
drawn by student 003 and wave fronts drawn by student
203 in Fig. 3 for example.)
Table IV shows a side-by-side comparison of R-trained
and T-trained students’ responses to questions 1–3. In each
question, students’ responses were coded ‘‘correct’’ if they
bent all the light rays in the correct direction at each
interface. If a student drew a pattern of rays that
(a) matched their training example and (b) violated the
refraction principle at one interface, we coded the response
as a ‘‘specificity violation.’’ Recall that all these students
could reliably apply the refraction principle at a single
interface (question 4).
These data show that R-trained students demonstrated
significantly more specificity violations in questions 1 and
2. In question 3, therewas no significant difference between
the groups. The responses shown in Fig. 3 are typical of
responses in this group. It is interesting to note that in the
triangle prism case, student 003 drew a pattern of light rays
that matched the superficial features of her training ex-
ample, but also did not violate the refraction principle just
learned. It is therefore impossible to tell whether she was
implementing principled knowledge or transferring surface
features of her training example into the new situation, or
both. Her response is typical of the T-trained group.A priori
we had not expected that the horizontal ray inside the
triangle prism used in training (Fig. 1) would be so salient
and bias the T-trained groups’ responses to such an extent.
Figure 3 shows examples of what we call the specificity
effect. The first row shows the responses of student 203
(a R-trained participant) to questions 1, 2, and 3. Note how
he draws a reasonable ray diagram for question 3, but
incorrectly reverses the direction of the exit ray in ques-
tions 1 and 2 to align his responsewith his training example
(Fig. 1).
In contrast, consider the response of student 003 (a
T-trained student) to questions 1, 2, and 3 shown in the
second row of Fig. 3. While her responses to questions 1
and 2 are incorrect, since participants did not learn the
numerical form of Snell’s law, we consider that she is
reliably instantiating the principle at both prism interfaces.
She makes the light ray bend towards the normal at the first
interface and remain undeviated at the second. From the
overall responses of the T-trained participants, it appears
that the horizontal segment of the ray diagram in the
training example (Fig. 1) is extremely salient and appears
to bias all their responses. For this reason, T-trained par-
ticipants’ responses to question 3 provide a less convincing
case for the specificity effect since the ray drawn inside
the prism struck the second interface slightly above the
TABLE IV. Evidence of specificity in algebra students.
Question 1, D prism Question 2, Rectangle prism Question 3, Triangle prism
R-trained T-trained R-trained T-trained R-trained T-trained
Correct 3 5 3 5 8 6
Specificity violation 8 1 8 0 1 1
p (Fisher exact test) 0.05 0.03 1.0
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normal. Even so, student 003 drew a sharply downward-
angled exit ray.
C. Experiment 2: Calculus students
Because of the unexpected salience of the horizontal ray
in the triangle prism example (Fig. 1) we modified the
training example for the triangle-trained students so that
the ray inside the prism was not horizontal (see Fig. 2). In
all other respects, the training phase was the same as
experiment 1. We changed the test questions in order to
better capture evidence for specificity. In particular, we did
not provide any normal line in question 5, requiring stu-
dents to apply the refraction principle entirely on their own
(see Table II).
1. General example bias
As in experiment 1, we measured the angle of incidence
and refraction drawn by each student at each optical inter-
face using a protractor. The results of these measurements
are presented in Table V.
We can deduce the following results from Table V. (a) In
every question, there is no evidence of example bias at the
first interface, and no example bias between the R-trained
and T-trained students in question 5. This indicates that
they all learned how to implement Snell’s law qualitatively
at a single interface. (b) There is evidence of an upward or
downward bias at the second glass-air interface between
the R-trained and T-trained students in questions 1, 2,
and 4, but no bias in question 3.
2. Specificity
As before, we examined the subset of students who
could answer question 5 correctly. Twenty-one R-trained
students answered question 5 correctly; twenty-two
T-trained students answered question 5 correctly. To evalu-
ate whether or not there was evidence of the specificity
effect, we restrict our analysis to questions 1 and 2 of the
test (the rectangle prism and the triangle prism). Students
who bent the light ray in the correct direction at both
interfaces were coded as ‘‘correct’’ while students who
drew a pattern of light rays that superficially matched their
training example and, in doing so, violated the refraction
principle by bending a light ray in the wrong direction were
coded as ‘‘specificity violation.’’
We found a result that is both striking and puzzling. Out
of the 21 R-trained students, 16 showed evidence of a
specificity violation in question 1 (the rectangle prism),
while all 21 drew correct light rays in question 2 (the
TABLE V. Summary of the angles and measures for calculus students.
Question Question 1, Rectangle
prism
Question 2, Triangle
prism
Question 3, Trap.
parallel part
Question 4, Trap.
triangle part
Question 5, Single
interface
Interface Air-Glass Glass-Air Air-Glass Glass-Air Glass-Air Glass-Air Glass-Air
Measure r ng sini  na sinr r ng sini  na sinr r r r
R-trained 28 0.70 37 0.25 25 23 55
T-trained 32 0.33 37 0.05 23 52 54
p (t test) 0.33 0.003 0.96 0.05 0.8 0.001 0.86
FIG. 4. Two participants’ responses to test questions 1 and 2.
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triangle prism). This shows clear evidence of specificity. In
contrast, out of the 22 T-trained students, 4 showed evi-
dence of a specificity violation in question 2 (triangle
prism) while 18 correctly answered question 1 (rectangle
prism) correctly. Even more interestingly, we could iden-
tify an additional 4 T-trained students who showed evi-
dence that they had drawn a specificity-biased light ray on
question 2, but had erased it and drawn the correct light ray.
In summary, we found specificity bias in both training
conditions, yet the effect seemed to be much stronger in
the R-trained group than in the T-trained group as evi-
denced by the larger number of students showing specific-
ity violations.
Figure 4 shows examples of the specificity effect in
2 calculus physics students. The first row shows the re-
sponses of student B13 (a R-trained participant) to ques-
tions 1 and 2. Note how he draws a reasonable ray diagram
for question 2, but incorrectly reverses the direction of the
exit ray in question 1 to align his response with his training
example (Fig. 2). C13 (a T-trained participant) also shows a
specificity-biased response in question 2, but correctly
answers question 1 as shown in the second row of Fig. 4.
Note how both participants seem to be trying to apply the
principle they just learned by drawing normal lines and
wave fronts at the interfaces.
IV. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The results of experiments 1 and 2 show evidence that
studentswho are able to implement the principle of refraction
can be biased to give answers that violate that principlewhen
the surface features of the test question superficially match
the example used to illustrate the principle during training.
Even when learning conceptually and interactively, partic-
ipants tended to use surface features of their training
example. When features of the test question were similar to
the training example, this seemed to stimulate many partic-
ipants to override or drop their principled knowledge and use
surface features of the training example to answer that par-
ticular question. It also does not appear that this results is
constrained to ‘‘weaker’’ algebra-based students. In fact, the
calculus physics students’ averageAmericanCollegeTesting
(ACT) math score was above the 95th percentile, indicating
that these students are exceptional.
The implications of these results may extend beyond the
example of refraction to many other areas of physics. If
generalizable to other areas of introductory physics, the
specificity effect has implications for how we measure
what our students know and have learned. For example,
if a multiple-choice distracter intentionally or inadver-
tently is made to look like an example students have
encountered in their class, they may be biased to select
that distracter, even though they displayed the ability to
implement the principle in another assessment (for ex-
ample, light bending at a single interface—like question 5).
Likewise, when designing instruction, we need to think
carefully about the examples we choose. First, if we use a
single example to illustrate a principle, it is likely that
students will learn the principle in too restrictive a context;
thus, multiple examples would help students draw con-
trasts [11] on application of the principle in different con-
texts. Second, students may inadvertently focus on surface
features of our examples that may appear extremely salient
to them, but may serve no purpose in illustrating
the physics principle we are trying to teach [12]. Further,
this binding of examples and principles can be used to the
instructor’s advantage to help students learn about the
principle. If learners think back and try to use an earlier
example when it is not appropriate and are explicitly
encouraged to consider why these similar cases are solved
differently, they may learn much about the principle by
comparing the two cases [13]
After the results of experiment 1, we hypothesized that
the salience of the horizontal line was the reason why we
did not see specificity in that experiment with the triangle-
trained group. However, experiment 2 did not fully support
our idea. Experiment 2 shows a remarkable asymmetry in
specificity. Sixteen rectangle-trained students showed spe-
cificity, while only four triangle-trained students (and pos-
sibly another four if we count the erasures) showed
specificity. There are two possible reasons we can specu-
late about.
(1) Some aspect of the triangle example was simply
‘‘better’’ for student learning. It is possible that the triangle
example did not have particular salient distracting surface
features possessed by the rectangle example. Such ques-
tions are beyond the scope of this study and likely better
suited to the domain of visual cognition in cognitive
science.
(2) It is likely that many of the physics students, espe-
cially these exceptionally high-ability students in experi-
ment 2, had seen refraction before and seen the rectangle
prism, so the triangle prism served as a contrasting case.
During the instructional phase many of the triangle-trained
students expressed an expectation that the light ray exiting
the triangle prism should turn up rather than down as they
tried to apply the car analogy in the context of the training
example. Realizing that this violated the principle, they
then drew a downward-angled ray. The fact that we saw
evidence of T-trained students correcting their specificity-
biased mistakes on question 2, and no evidence of this
correction among the R-trained students, suggests that the
T-trained students are thinking more carefully about what
they are doing.
Finally, our results raise the question as to whether
expert physicists are influenced by the specificity effect.
How does a physicist recognize a physics problem as a
particular type of problem (e.g., an energy conservation
problem)? We speculate that experts use surface features
of problems to help them cue their principled knowledge,
but clearly surface features can fit various principles
SPECIFICITY, TRANSFER, AND THE . . . PHYS. REV. ST PHYS. EDUC. RES. 7, 010105 (2011)
010105-7
depending on context. Hence, it is the surface features in
conjunction with context that create cuing priorities that
facilitate experts’ selection of specific principles. In other
words, some principles are more likely applicable to a
problem with certain surface features and specific context.
If this is the case, it is possible that the expert can be
distracted by surface features, just like the students in our
study, especially when those surface features are used in
unusual or uncommon contexts. Perhaps what makes an
expert reliably choose principles to apply to problems is
that, more often than not, certain surface features and
contexts tend to go together, and by extensive experience
experts become facile at recognizing those mappings so
that appropriate principles are cued. When working in
cutting edge problems, however, even experts can be sur-
prised that their extensive knowledge may be insufficient
to figure out what is going on, and these surprises often
lead to significant discoveries [14]. Further research may
examine whether there are other aspects to physics exper-
tise that extend beyond the ability to cue principled knowl-
edge in order to successfully solve a physics problem when
principled knowledge is insufficient [15].
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